埃塞俄比亚和马来西亚与中国交往的比较分析：以“一带一路”倡议为例

林鏆湙 【马来西亚】

新加坡南洋理工大学南洋公共管理研究生院博士后研究员

吉迪恩·贾拉塔 【埃塞俄比亚】

乐施会中非对话论坛项目经理

自中国于2013年提出“一带一路”倡议以来，埃塞俄比亚和马来西亚一直处于各自地区（即东非和东南亚）与中国合作的前沿。尽管埃塞俄比亚和马来西亚彼此似乎共同点并不多，但是我们认为，特别是在吸引中国投资方面两国均拥有支持增长的体制来借助中国这一经济引擎的力量。两国同时也都善于处理与地区和全球大国的外交关系以维护各自的主权。我们并不鼓励其他经济体建立类似的“亲中”体制，但是本文所讨论的原则，为渴望就“一带一路”倡议与中国建立紧密关系的其他发展中经济体提供了政策借鉴，或者至少说是一些初步指导。

一 简述

自从2013年“一带一路”倡议宣布以来，中国企业在海外的扩张被广泛报道。其中一个最常见的分析思路认为，中国企业，特别是中国国有企业，体现了中国日益娴熟的外交手腕。这一看法宣扬“中国威胁论”的认识，（通常）选择孤立的事件以证明，中国政府利用其大批国有跨国公司作为与其他国家接触的手段，最终实现在诸如东非和东南亚这样的周边地区提升其政治影响力以抗衡美国霸权的目的（Naím，2007年）。然而，实际情况要比之复杂得多，因为这些边缘地区的国家（通常）拥有足够的能力对来自中国的资本加以管理和调和，使之用于促进其自身目标的实现。对埃塞俄比亚和马来西亚这两个在各自地区积极支持（同时也对其保持谨慎）“一带一路”倡议的国家而言，更是如此。这两个国家为何如此擅长与中国打交道？换句话说，它们成功的关键因素是什么？除了它们各自独特的地理位置之外（两国均处于东西方之间的战略地理位置），对肤浅的观察者而言，两国之间的共同点确实乏善可陈。然而，如果我们深入研究这一问题，会逐渐发现有助于两国对中国的政治和经济力量加以调和从而使其服务于促进各自发展议程这一目标的某些共同特点。

二 主要内容

虽然与日本这样典型的发展国家和“亚洲四小龙”这样的一线经济体比较起来相对较弱，但是埃塞俄比亚和马来西亚拥有推动工业化发展的十分有效的体系。尤其是两国均善于吸引外国直接投资（包括但不仅限于中国投资）以促进其经济增长。对外资的开放无疑促进了其经济的增长。埃塞俄比亚为其作为东非地区增长最快的经济体而引以为傲——自1991年重建和平以来其国内生产总值以惊人的速度不断增长。而马来西亚也自1957年独立以来实现了从一个农业经济体发展成为一个相对成熟经济体的跨越，巩固了其作为“亚洲四小虎”这样的二线经济体之一的地位。

近来，埃塞俄比亚和马来西亚迅速地抓住了“一带一路”倡议的机会，在中国企业的支持下实施了一系列需要较长孕育期的资本密集型项目。在埃塞俄比亚，中铁集团和中国土木工程集团利用3家中国国有银行的融资，联合承建了亚的斯亚贝巴至吉布提的铁路。在马来西亚，马来西亚—中国关丹产业园区项目（MCKIP）于2013年启动，这是位于广西的中国—马来西亚钦州工业园区的姊妹项目。上述两个工业园区常被视为“一带一路”倡议在该地区的旗舰项目，甚至在更广泛的领域作为面向东南亚其他国家的示范案例。它们也是由中国国有企业与马来西亚联合承建的。

另一个支撑上述成功的关键因素是两国对地缘政治的精通。两国均位于东西方的十字路口，备受全球和地区大国的关注。埃塞俄比亚更具有作为进入非洲之角的跳板这一战略位置的优势。其成功地发挥了对邻国的吉布提港的影响力，从而减轻了其作为内陆国的劣势，开拓了一条连接中东与东非市场的重要贸易通道。而马来西亚则毗邻世界最重要的航运通道之一的马六甲海峡。特别是中国长期以来一直在寻求克服对马六甲海峡的过度依赖，即所谓的“马六甲困局”。目前中国80%的能源供给需要通过这一狭窄航道的运输。

尽管拥有地理上的战略位置，两国都极为精明地利用多个地区安全和政治安排机制来维护各自主权。具体而言，两国都精于拉拢强大盟友以维护其政治上的自主性。西方大国（包括与其结盟的国家）是两国首选的安全合作伙伴，比如两国迅速地加入了诸如美国领导的全球反恐战争这样的倡议。两国虽然在经济发展方面日益依赖中国，但是却在平衡中美利益方面展现出各自的灵活性，同时并未牺牲各自主权的完整。鉴此，埃塞俄比亚和马来西亚两国的政治精英必须为其同时与华盛顿和北京保持密切关系所做出的贡献而得到赞赏 [1]。比如，埃塞俄比亚已故总理梅莱斯·泽纳维（Meles Zenawi）因其在埃塞内战期间（1974—1991）以及和平时期（1991年后）与美国和中国同时建立了合作关系而闻名。他所提出的东非发展模式借鉴了中国的发展经验（Cheru，2016）。而马来西亚总理纳吉布·拉扎克（Najib Razak）同样善于处理与中美两国的外交关系。他同时也从已故总理敦·阿卜杜勒·拉扎克（Tun Abdul Razak）在其任内与中国建立的特殊关系中受益——当时，马来西亚于1974年成为首个与中国建立外交关系的东南亚国家。在之后历任的马来西亚总理任内，特别是在现任总理纳吉布的领导下，中马双边关系得到了不断的发展（Negeow，2017年）。

三 结语

总之，埃塞俄比亚和马来西亚两国具有支持增长的体制以吸引来自中国的外国直接投资，特别是需要较长偿还期的资金密集型项目。两国同时也在处理与地区和全球大国（比如中国）的外交关系从而维护国家主权方面展现出了能力。这些体制具有历史渊源，并不容易复制，从而使得两国在参与“一带一路”倡议时相比地区竞争对手具有独特的优势。更为重要的是，两国的能动性和自主性对大众媒体宣扬的“中国威胁论”起到了削弱的作用。

Comparative Perspectives of Ethiopian and Malaysian Engagement with China: the Case of the “Belt and Road” Initiative

Guanie Lim Cia Lit/Malaysia

Postdoctoral Fellow of the Nanyang Centre for Public Administration,Nanyang Technological University,Singapore

Gedion Jalata/Ethiopia

Program Manager of the Africa-China Dialogue Platform(ACDP),Oxfam International

Since China’s 2013 announcement of the “Belt and Road” Initiative(BRI),Ethiopia and Malaysia have been at the forefront in collaborating with China in their respective subcontinents(East Africa and Southeast Asia,respectively).While there appears to be few similarities between Ethiopia and Malaysia,we argue that both countries possess pro-growth institutions to tap into China’s economic engine,especially in attracting Chinese investment.They are also adept in managing their foreign relationship with regional and global powers to maintain their sovereignty.While we stop short of exhorting other economies to construct similar “pro-China”institutions,the principles discussed provide policy lessons,or at least some initial guidance,for other developing economies aspiring to forge closer ties with China in relation to the Belt and Road Initiative.

Ⅰ.Introduction

Since the BRI was announced in 2013,there has been wide coverage of the overseas expansion of Chinese firms.One of the most common line of analysis portrays Chinese firms,especially the state-owned enterprises(SOEs),as manifestations of China’s increasingly skillful diplomacy.This portrayal propagates the “China Threat” belief,picking out(often)isolated cases to argue that the Chinese state uses its large cohort of SOEs’ transnational businesses as a means to engage with other countries,with the ultimate aim of bolstering its political influence against US domination in peripheral regions such as East Africa and Southeast Asia(see Naím,2007).

Nevertheless,the on-the-ground reality is considerably more complex as states in these marginal regions do(and often)possess ample capacity to manage and mediate Chinese capital,utilizing the latter to further their own goals.This is especially true in Ethiopia and Malaysia,two of the more active(yet cautious)proponents of the BRI in their respective sub-regions.What makes these two countries so adept at dealing with China? In other words,what are their critical success factors? Beyond their unique geopolitical locations(both are strategically located between East and West),they share very little commonalities to the casual observer.However,if we delve deeper into the issue,we begin to observe some common features that help both countries mediate Chinese political economic might to further their own agenda.

Ⅱ.Content

While relatively weak compared to the archetypical developmental states of Japan and the first-tier Asian tiger economies,both Ethiopia and Malaysia possess fairly effective institutions in driving industrialization.In particular,they are good at attracting foreign direct investment(FDI),including but not limited to Chinese capital,to bolster growth.The openness to foreign capital has certainly helped them grow their economies.Ethiopia prides itself on being the fastest-growing economy of East Africa,expanding its gross domestic product(GDP)at an impressive pace since peace resumed in 1991(Oqubay,2016; Alemu and Scoones,2013).For Malaysia,it has also transformed its previously agrarian economy to a relatively sophisticated one since its independence in 1957,cementing its position as a second-tier Asian tiger economy(Lim,2014).

In recent times,the Ethiopians and Malaysians have been noticeably quick to seize upon the BRI,implementing capital-intensive projects with long gestation period with the support of Chinese firms.For Ethiopia,the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway was built by the state-owned China Railway Group and the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation,with financing provided by three stateowned Chinese banks.For Malaysia,the MCKIP Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park(MCKIP)was launched in 2013 as the sister park of China-Malaysia Qinzhou Industrial Park(CMQIP)in Guangxi province.Both industrial parks are often earmarked as flagship BRI projects in the region and more generally,the ideal demonstrative case studies for other Southeast Asian countries(Kong,2016).They are also jointly constructed by the SOEs of China and Malaysia.

Another key factor undergirding their success is their mastery of geopolitics.Both countries are situated at the crossroads of East and West,granting them the attention of global and regional powers.Ethiopia’s location gives it strategic dominance as a jumping off point in the Horn of Africa.It has managed to leverage the neighboring Port of Djibouti,alleviating its landlocked status ad granting it a critical trading route interconnecting the markets of the Middle East and Eastern Africa.For Malaysia,it enjoys direct access to the Strait of Malacca,one of the most important shipping lanes in the world.In particular,Beijing has long sought to bridge its over-reliance on the Strait of Malacca,what it calls the “Malacca Dilemma”.In terms of energy supplies,about 80% of current Chinese energy needs pass through this narrow waterway.

Notwithstanding their geostrategic locations,both Ethiopia and Malaysia are savvy enough to maintain their sovereignty through several regional security and political arrangements.More specifically,they are astute in drawing in powerful allies to maintain their political autonomy.Western powers(and those aligned to them)are the preferred security partners as they have swiftly joined initiatives such as the US-led Global War on Terror(see Noor and Qistina,2017).Despite an increasing reliance on China for economic growth,Ethiopia and Malaysia have displayed their resilience in “balancing” the interests of US and China,without compromising their integrity.To this end,the Ethiopian and Malaysian political elites must be credited for maintaining a close relationship with both Washington and Beijing.[2]For instance,Meles Zenawi,the late Ethiopian Prime Minister,was famed for forging cooperative ties with US and China both during the Ethiopian civil war(1974-1991)and peaceful times(post-1991).He is known to advocate an East Asian style of development,often borrowing the development experience of China(Cheru,2016).For Malaysia,Prime Minister Najib Razak is just as adept in handling foreign affairs with respect to US and China.He also benefits from Malaysia’s special relationship with China when,under the Prime Ministership of Tun Abdul Razak,it became the first Southeast Asian country to establish diplomatic ties with the Chinese in 1974.The bilateral tie has blossomed under successive Prime Ministers,especially under the leadership of Prime Minister Najib(the son of Tun Abdul Razak)(Ngeow,2017).

Ⅲ.Conclusion

In summary,we have made the case that Ethiopia and Malaysia possess progrowth institutions to attract Chinese FDI,especially in capital-intensive projects with long payoff period.Both countries have also displayed competence in managing their foreign relationship with regional and global powers(such as China)to maintain their sovereignty.These institutions have historical origins and are not easily replicable,granting them a distinct advantage over their regional rivals in tapping into the BRI.More importantly,the agency and autonomy of these two states weaken the “China Threat” thesis promulgated by the popular media.

References

Alemu,D.,& Scoones,I.(2013).Negotiating New Relationships: How the Ethiopian State is Involving China and Brazil in Agriculture and Rural Development.IDS Bulletin,44(4),91-100.

Cheru,F.(2016).Emerging Southern Powers and New Forms of South–South Cooperation:Ethiopia’s Strategic Engagement with China and India.Third World Quarterly,37(4),592-610.

Kong,T.Y.(2016).China’s 21stCentury Maritime Silk Road: Malaysian Perspectives.In T.

W.Lim,H.Chan,K.Tseng,& W.X.Lim(Eds.),China’s One Belt One Road Initiative(pp.289- 306).London: Imperial College Press.

Lim,G.(2014).The Internationalisation of Mainland Chinese Firms into Malaysia: From Obligated Embeddedness to Active Embeddedness.Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs,33(2),59-90.

Naím,M.(2007).Rogue Aid.Foreign Policy,March/April 2007(159),95-96.

Ngeow,C.B.(2017).Barisan Nasional and the Chinese Communist Party: A Case Study in China’s Party-Based Diplomacy.The China Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Greater China,17(1),53-82.

Noor,E.,& Qistina,T.(2017).Great Power Rivalries,Domestic Politics and Malaysian Foreign Policy.Asian Security,13(3),200-219.

Oqubay,A.(2016).Made in Africa: Industrial Policy in Ethiopia,Oxford: Oxford University Press.